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CASE COMMENT
market, therefore, the elimination of a potential competitor may
affect competition as adversely as the elimination of actual com-
petition, and it is thus desirable to consider lessening of potential
as well as actual competition in section 7 cases.
The opportunity to give economic justification may be of
more significance to a defendant in a joint venture than in a
merger case. In a merger the only rehabilitating economic justifi-
cation is the failing company doctrine;30 but a joint venture,
otherwise illegal, may have been justifiably motivated by a need
for the gathering of necessary risk capital or for pooling of risks
inherent in significant industrial innovation." While the Court
in Penn-Olin generally equates the merger with the joint venture,
among the suggested criteria to be viewed on remand is "the rea-
sons and necessities for its existence."32 This suggests that the
Court recognized that the exceptions accorded the joint ventures
under section 7 may be broader than the single merger exception.
If such is the case, the Court has achieved a desirable balance:
those ventures most likely to result in anticompetitive effects
may be effectively enjoined, while preserving those that serve an
economic purpose.
Thus, Penn-Olin appears to establish a two step process for
determining the validity of a joint venture under section 7. First
the Government must prove that absent the joint venture each
parent would have been an actual or potential competitor. Having
shown this, if the venture corporation represents a substantial
market share of the market it has entered - the single factor
examined in present merger analysis - the burden shifts to the
defendants to give an economic justification or to show lack of
adverse effect on competition. If, however, the venture does not
represent a substantial market share, the burden of proof may
remain with the Government and the Court will employ the
multifactor test.
Constitutional Law-Legal Ethics-State Proscription
of Solicitation Limited by Constitution
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, through its depart-
ment of legal counsel, advises its injured members or the families
80. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 299-s03 (1930).
See also United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 n.46
(1963); Hall & Philips, supra note 15, at 216; Note, 14 STAN. L. REV. 777,
796 (1962).
31. See Boyle, supra note 9, at 304-07; Dixon, supra note 28, at 399;
Hale, supra note 9, at 928-29.
32. 378 U.S. at 177.
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of those killed on the job not to settle their claims without first
seeing a lawyer and recommends that they contact the regional
lawyer approved by the Union.' At the behest of the state bar
association, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia2 enjoined
the Brotherhood from engaging in these activities3 as contrary to
statutes regulating solicitation and the practice of law within the
State.4 The United States Supreme Court struck down the in-
junction,' holding that the enjoined activity is protected under
the first and fourteenth amendments.0 Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, rehearing
denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964).
1. Under the union's plan, the United States is divided into 16 regions.
A lawyer or firm with a reputation of honesty and skill in representing plain-
tiffs in railroad personal injury litigation is selected by the union's department
of legal counsel in each region on the advice of lawyers and judges. This
selection is subject to the approval of the union's president who also has the
power to discharge the attorneys. After an accident, the secretary of the local
lodge contacts the injured worker or his survivors and recommends their
contacting the one approved regional lawyer. At the union's expense, a staff
of investigators is maintained to gather evidence for use by the injured
worker should a trial become necessary. It is admitted by the Brotherhood
that the result of this plan is the channeling of almost all legal employment
by its members to the particular approved lawyer. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 4-5, 11 (1964).
2. Unreported decision of Va. Sup. Ct. App., June 12, 1962, affirming an
injunction granted by the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.
3. Specifically, the Virginia court enjoined the Brotherhood
. . . from holding out lawyers selected by it as the only approved
lawyers to aid the members or their families; . . . or in any other man-
ner soliciting or encouraging such legal employment of the selected
lawyers; . .. and from doing any act or combination of acts, and from
formulating and putting into practice any plan, pattern or design, the
result of which is to channel legal employment to any particular lawyer
or group of lawyers ....
Quoted in 377 U.S. at 4. Furthermore, the decree enjoined the union from
sharing counsel fees with recommended lawyers and from encouraging the
sharing of fees by its regional investigators. Id. at 5 n.9.
4. Only persons who have obtained a license may practice law in Virginia.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-42 (1950). VA. CODE Am. § 54-83.1 (1950) provides that
an injunction may be sought to restrain permanently an individual or any per-
son, firm, partnership or association acting for him, from soliciting legal em-
ployment.
5. The Brotherhood did not contest those parts of the injunction relating
to fee-sharing but rather denied that it has engaged in such practices. The
Court assumed that no such fee-sharing existed- the strongest case for the
union-and passed only on the other provisions of the injunction. 377 U.S.
at 5 n.9.
6. Id. at 8.
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The first amendment 7 protects freedom of speech and assembly
against governmental encroachment." By construction, constitu-
tional protection is extended to the right of association as a
necessary cognate to free speech and assembly.' Thus, workers
have a constitutional right to associate by joining a labor union."o
Freedom of speech is not limited to abstract discussion but ex-
tends to the vigorous advocacy of ideas."' However, these first
amendment freedoms are not absolute but are subject to federal
or state restriction in the public interest. 2 Conflict over the
extent of constitutional protection has been resolved by a
balancing of the individual's rights" with the interests which the
state is trying to protect.'
Traditionally, states have controlled the practice of law within
7. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); Thomas v.
Collins, 823 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936). The fourteenth amendment protects these rights against state
violation. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Thomhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
9. De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 8. See also Bates v. City of Little Rock,
supra note 8; NAACP v. Alabama, supra note 8; Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 CoLmM. L.
REV. 1361 (1963); Fellman, Constitutional Rights of Association, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 74.
10. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); cf. Note, Constitutional Right to Membership
in a Labor Union-5th and 14th Amendments, 8 J. PuB. L. 580 (1959).
Similarly, freedom of association includes the right to join a political party.
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra note 9, at 249.
11. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra note 9, at 250-51. See also
Fellman, supra note 9, at 104-08.
19. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
13. Organizations engaged in activities claimed to be constitutionally
protected may assert the corresponding rights of their individual members
as well as asserting these constitutional rights on their own behalf. Louisiana
ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 n.9 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458
(1958). Specifically, unions may assert their members' rights since "there is
a direct community of interest between it and its members. . . ." Brotherhood
of Stationary Eng'rs v. St. Louis, 212 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo. App. 1948).
14. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 542 (1951); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
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their borders"' by regulating entrance into the profession and
setting standards of conduct.' This regulation seeks to promote
the profession's high quality and dignity.'7 Canons of legal ethics
prohibit, among numerous other practices,' solicitation" and
advertising"0 to obtain legal business. Such commercial methods
of competing for clients have been deemed unbecoming to the
profession as well as enhancing the possibility of fraudulent
claims, overcharging of fees, and overburdening the courts with
unfounded litigation? A form of indirect solicitation occurs when
15. This regulation necessarily belongs to the states. Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (concurring opinion).
16. To some extent the legal profession itself, the state legislatures, and
finally the state courts exercise control over who may become a member of
the profession. See In re McDonald, q04 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677 (1938). In
Minnesota, for example, standards for admission to the bar, include good
moral character (R.R), the passing of a written examination (R.3), and pos-
session of defined educational qualifications (R.5). Rules of the Supreme Court
for Admission to the Bar, 27A Mmo. STAT. AN. 47 (1958). It is considered
that an organization, unable to qualify as an officer of the court and not
admitted to the bar, cannot practice law itself, Divine v. Watanga Hospital,
137 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1956), nor can it do so indirectly by employing
lawyers to practice for it, In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E.
15 (1910). If an organization does so, it is engaged in an unauthorized prac-
tice of law. See, e.g., Mnar. STAT. § 481.02 (1961). Both the organization, In
the Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936),
and the individual attorney, In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318
(1930), are liable to court sanctions. As to the required standard of conduct
for lawyers see notes 18-20 infra.
17. See, e.g., Steer & Adair v. Land Title Guar. & Trust Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs.
s3, 113 N.E.2d 763 (C.P. 1953); Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 674, 681-82
(1958); Note, 72 YALE LJ. 1613, 1630 (1963).
18. Most states have adopted the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics which forbid, inter alia, the following: stirring up of litiga-
tion either directly or through agents (Canon 28), fee-splitting (Canon 34),
letting himself be controlled or exploited by lay intermediaries (Canon 35),
or aiding the unauthorized practice of law (Canon 47). In Virginia, for ex-
ample, see Rules for Integration of the Bar, 171 Va. xviii (1938).
19. This prohibition is based partly on the common-law offenses of cham-
perty (a division of proceeds of litigation between the owner of the litigating
claim and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation), Chester H. Roth Co.
v. Esquire, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 848 (D.C.N.Y. 1949), and barratry (the offense
of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits), Churchwell v. State, 195 Ga.
22, 25, 22 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1942). Today the ban is expressed in most states
by statutes following ABA Canons 27 and 28 which condemn solicitation by
lawyers or their agents. 63 CoLui. L. REv. 1502, 1504 (1963).
20. ABA Canon 27 specifically prohibits direct or indirect advertising.
This is closely related to solicitation since the purpose of advertising is to
gain professional employment.
21. See DRnKER, LEGAL ETiics 64, 212 (1953); Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CALmF. L. REV. 48 (1935); Note, Legal Ethics -Ambulance
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an organization contacts one of its members who is in need of
legal service and refers him to a lawyer selected by the organiza-
tion? Because the organization functions between the lawyer
and client in their traditional relationship, it is referred to as a
lay intermediary?3 With rare exception," states have proscribed
the law-related activities of such organizations 5 and have found
the lawyer to be in violation of the Canons of Legal Ethics. 0
Only infrequently has it been asserted that the Constitution
limits state regulation of the legal profession.
In NAACP v. Button ,2 the Supreme Court for the first time
Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 182 (1955); Comment, Settlement of Personal
Injury Cases in the Chicago Area, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 895 (1953); 63 Comm.
L. REv. 1502, 1504-05 (1963). For a critical analysis of these reasons see
Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. Rv. 674 (1958).
22. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950);
In re: Petition of the Comm. on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio
L. Abs. 106 (Ct. App. 1933).
!3. See note 43 infra.
24. The ABA approved the law-related activities of the American Liberty
League - offering free legal service to the needy who felt their constitutional
rights had been violated by the New Deal Legislation-because of the far
reaching social problem otherwise unsolved. See ABA Comr. oN PROFEs-
sioNAL Ernics Am GRmvANCEs, OpNIox 148 (1935). Legal aid clinics are
condoned. ABA Canon 35, note 26 infra. Also, a few lower courts have to
some extent approved the practices of non-profit lay intermediaries. E.g., In re
Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D.C.D. Md. 1934); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191
Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940).
25. Most often the organization is attacked for solicitation or for engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law. See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Chicago Motor Club, 369 Il. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); In the Matter of Maclub
of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); Clark, The Effect of the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Upon the Ethics of the Legal Profession, 5 LAw
& CoNTMn. PROB. 97, 99 (1938).
R6. ABA CAwows or PRorEssIoNAIm AN UNcI, Ernics, Canon 35, at 32
(1947) provides that:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications
are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the perform-
ance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's
relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should
be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents
are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as
an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in
any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but
this employment should not include the rendering of legal services to
the members of such an organization in respect to their individual
affairs.
27. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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limited state regulation of the law related activities of a lay
intermediary when it sanctioned the NAACP's practice of en-
couraging maintenance of civil rights litigation by its members
and employing lawyers for their use. 8 The Court extended the
first amendment rights of the NAACP and its members to include
action to secure their constitutionally guaranteed civil rights and
struck down the Virginia statute29 proscribing these practices.30
It stressed that the solicitation of litigation was undertaken, not
to resolve private differences, but to achieve the federal policy of
equal rights for Negroes - that the resultant litigation was a
constitutionally protected "form of political expression."' The
Court recognized Virginia's interest in regulating legal ethics but
did not find sufficient evidence of substantive evils to justify its
exercise in Button.32 However, the Court failed to establish any
definite guidelines of protection to be afforded other lay inter-
mediaries."
Unexpectedly," on the strength of Button," the Court in R.R.
28. See 63 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1502 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term,
77 HlAnv. L. REV. 62, 122 (1963); Note, 72 YALE L.. 1613 (1963); cf. Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961), which held that the State's inter-
est in regulating the legal profession and who shall be permitted to practice
outweighs any deterrent effect on freedom of speech and association; and Mc-
Closkey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920), in which a state statute forbidding
solicitation was upheld, as not violating rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 89 (1961).
29. In 1956, in an effort to curb the effectiveness of the NAACP in civil
rights litigation, Virginia enacted legislation, specifically Chapter 33, which
broadened the definition of "runner" or "capper" to include the Association's
legal program. 371 U.S. at 423-24; Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1619-29 (1963).
30. 371 U.S. at 428-29, 437.
81. Id. at 429.
32. Conducting litigation to enforce constitutional rights does not contain
malicious intent, a necessary element of the common-law offense of stirring up
litigation. Id. at 439-40. Also, there was no showing of a conflict of inter-
est between the NAACP and its members. Id. at 443. Furthermore, no mone-
tary or other private gains were involved since lawsuits attacking racial
discrimination are not popular nor profitable. Ibid.
33. Id. at 442.
34. The Ohio Court, construing Button, held it did not apply to a case
in which a lawyer had agreed to act as local counsel in the handling of claims
for union members under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).
Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963). The
opinion distinguished Button, holding that litigation for private gain, con-
taining greater possibility of abuse, is not entitled to the same protection
accorded civil rights litigation. See also, on the expected scope of Button, 63
CoLvM. L. REv. 1502 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HAnv. L.
REV. 62, 122 (1963); Note, 72 YALE L.T. 1613 (1963).
35. The dissent in the instant case distinguished NAACP v. Button on
the grounds that the union's practices are directed at "personal injury litiga-
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Trainmen felt compelled to protect the activities of the Brother-
hoodP0 It held that the first amendment gives workers the right
to act together and advise one another regarding their rights
under federal statute,"7 and that this constitutional guarantee
includes the right of the members, through a special department,
to advise each other concerning the need for legal advice and the
choice of legal counsel." Since "what Virginia has sought to
halt is not a commercialization of the legal profession . . . [or]
'ambulance chasing,' . . . [because] the railroad workers . . .
obviously are not engaged in the practice of law, [and because
neither] they [n]or the lawyers whom they select [are] parties to
any solicitation of business,"" the Court found no substantive
evil to justify restriction of constitutional rights in the name of
regulation of the legal profession.40 More strongly, the Court
casts doubt on the existence of any substantive evil that would
justify even slight restriction of the Brotherhood's members'
constitutional protection to "preserve and enforce rights granted
them under federal law."41
tion [which] is not a form of political expression... . Here, the question in-
volves solely the regulation of the profession, a power long recognized as
belonging peculiarly to the State." 377 U.S. at 10. Compare note 31 supra and
accompanying text.
86. As stated in notes S-5 supra and accompanying text, Virginia enjoined
the Brotherhood from engaging in solicitation and related activities. The
president of the ABA suggests that existing canons be strictly enforced
against individual attorneys participating in such activities, notwithstanding
the instant decision. 30 A.B.A. UNAUTHORIZED PRCTICE NEWs 114-15 (1964).
However, the Court in dictum seems to protect the lawyer along with the
intermediary: ". . . and, of course, lawyers accepting employment under this
constitutionally protected plan have a like protection which the State cannot
abridge." 377 U.S. at 8.
37. The rights here involved are created by FELA, S5 Stat. 65 (1909), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958), and the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat.
531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1958).
38. 877 U.S. at 6. Given Button and the cases cited therein, this conclusion is
inescapable. Therefore, the remainder of this paper addresses itself to the
other half of the instant decision, namely, that the State has failed to estab-
lish a countervailing regulatory interest.
89. 377 U.S. at 6-7.
40. After recognizing that "Virginia undoubtedly has broad powers to
regulate the practice of law within its borders," the Court concludes that the
"State again has failed to show any appreciable public interest in preventing
the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan." Id. at 6, 8.
41. The instant Court reversed without analysis the trial court's fact find-
ing that the Brotherhood's plan did present a substantive evil. See note 40
supra and accompanying text. The Court continued:
A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional
conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals . . .
to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate
1964] 889
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It is widely recognized that certain activities42 of lay inter-
mediaries4 are socially desirable." Membership organizations,
such as the Brotherhood and the NAACP, can cheaply and
conveniently inform their hitherto ignorant members of legal
rights, the availability of legal guidance, and the competence of
specified lawyers." Group legal activities are particularly desir-
able when, in addition to aiding individuals, they further some
otherwise frustrated social goal. Thus, the instant majority found
that combined action through the Brotherhood secures members'
a basic public interest. Laymen cannot be expected to know how to
protect their rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled
adversaries, . .. [citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963)] and
for them to associate together to help one another to preserve and
enforce rights granted them under federal laws cannot be condemned
as a threat to legal ethics.
377 U.S. at 7 (Emphasis added.) Later, without mentioning opposing State
regulatory interests, the Court declared that "since . .. [Virginia's] decree ...
infringes those rights, it cannot stand ... ." Id. at 8.
42. The instant dissent sanctions certain activities of such an organiza-
tion -i.e., simply recommending a competent lawyer to its members. Id. at 12.
43. The following discussion of the advantages and dangers of lay inter-
mediaries is general in scope with some emphasis on membership organizations
such as the Brotherhood. A more critical analysis would examine the merits
of each specific class of organization. It is suggested that the following categor-
ization would be helpful in this pursuit: (a) a corporation such as a bank or
trust company directly employing an attorney to render legal services to its
customers for which they are charged, (b) a non-profit organization such as a
union, an automobile association, a trade association or a private club which
employs a lawyer or directs its members to a specific lawyer but which does
not exist primarily for this purpose, (c) a group organized primarily for the
purpose of employing a lawyer to serve the members without charge, the costs
of his services being paid out of dues assessed against the members, (d) an
employer employing an attorney to provide legal services to its employees as a
fringe benefit, (e) several persons having a common interest, such as a small
hunting club, employing a lawyer for a common fee. See DRWnKu, LEGAL
Ermcs 161-68 (1953); PIRSIG, CASEs AND ISITEIAis oN PRoFEssIoNAL RE-
SPoNsIBXLnrr (1965).
44. Thus, the existing prohibition of all quasi-legal activities of such
organizations has been broadly criticized. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. State Bar,
36 Cal. 2d 504, 515, 521, 225 P.2d 508, 514, 518 (1950) (dissenting opinions of
Carter, J., and Traynor, J.); Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices-and
Cures?, 5 LAW & CoNTE1NP. PROB. 104, 127-28 (1938); 63 CoLArt. L. REV.
1502, 1511 (1963). Recently, a committee of the California State Bar Associa-
tion suggested radical changes in traditional ethical standards to permit mem-
bership organizations to render all legal services to their members at group
expense. St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, Oct. 11, 1964, § 1, p. 4.
45. DmNKER, LEGAL ETmcs 166 (1953); Cheatham, A Lawyer When
Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 COLIm. L. REv. 978, 980-86
(1963); Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-pecuniary Corporations: A Social
Utility, 2 U. Cm. L. REV. 119 (1934).
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rights under federal legislation better than the individual action
of members;40 the NAACP similarly was found to secure its
members' constitutional rights to equal protection. 7 Legal aid
societies, the one generally approved type of lay intermediary,
emphasize the necessity of group efforts to insure legal assistance
for low income members of society.48
However, as the history of the Brotherhood's plan itself illus-
trates,4o numerous undesirable practices have been found to
accompany the activities of certain lay intermediary organiza-
tions.c0 The intermediary's posture between the lawyer and his
client, traditionally in a direct relationship, divides the lawyer's
loyalty between his client and the membership group or its lead-
ers," and worse still, lends itself to various types of fee splitting
46. Historically, employees were frustrated in securing their rights under
the FELA and Safety Appliance Acts. Their inadequate legal representation
permitted the railroad lawyers and claims adjusters to take advantage of them
and frustrate the policy of the statutes to make recovery for injury easy. The
instant majority reviews this history and concludes that the Brotherhood's
legal activities have contributed to employees' recent success in obtaining
their rights under the statute. 377 U.S. -t 2-4. The dissent takes issue with
this conclusion. Id. at 9.
47. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
The Brotherhood's goal of securing compliance with the policy expressed
by the FELA does not seem as socially compelling as the NAACP's action
to secure equal civil rights for Negroes.
Nevertheless, both situations illustrate that encouragement of litigation is
sometimes socially desirable -and, in fact, that it is really only unfounded
litigation which ought not be encouraged. See note 18 supra.
48. ABA Canon 35, quoted note 26 supra, for example, excludes legal aid
societies for indigents from its ban of lay intermediaries. See also Cheatham,
A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 CoLum. L.
Ruv. 973 (1963); Smith, Legal Services Offices for Persons of Moderate Means,
31 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 37 (1947).
49. The Brotherhood's plan often has been before the courts. Among the
activities previously found to exist were official fee-splitting with the union,
unofficial "kick-backs" to individual local officials who brought the injured
member to the attorney, union-determined fees, and the employment of
coercive tactics to secure business, including the showing of copies of previous
settlement checks and favorable newspaper reports about the attorney to
prospective clients. See, e.g., In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d
391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933.)
The instant dissent is skeptical that the union has reformed, as assumed by
the majority. 377 U.S. at 11.
50. See note 43 supra.
51. Obviously, effective legal service demands that the lawyer's entire
effort be in the best interest of the client, and in the conflicting interest of no
other person or organization. Such conflict may result from the division of
allegiance inherent in the intervention of an intermediary. See, e.g., Pioneer
Title & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 326 P.2d 408 (Nev. 1958); In the Matter of
Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936).
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whereby the attorney "kicks back" a part of his fee to the lay
organization which supplies him with business.5 2 This kind of
financial dependence strengthens the lawyer's allegiance to the
organization," necessarily weakening his regard for his client;
the organization becomes in effect the soliciting agent of the
lawyer." The arrangement also may coerce acceptance of the
chosen lawyer by the member,"5 thus limiting his free choice of
attorney. In addition, because the organization is not restricted
by professional ethics, it may stir up unfounded claims and
litigation." Finally, fear exists that the activities of such organi-
zations concentrate legal work in the hands of a few lawyers to
the prejudice of the remainder of the bar.T
The plan before the Court in R.R. Trainmen, however, mini-
The direct, familiar relationship between lawyer and client is desirable as
an end in itself because of the trust in and respect for the legal process that
it engenders in laymen. Note, 72 Haxv. L. REV. 1334, 1340 (1959). See also
Canon 35, quoted supra note 26.
52. State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12,
177 Pac. 694 (1919); Note, 72 HARv. L. Rv. 1384, 1845 (1959); DiRNER,
LEGAL ETHICs 167 n.88 (1953).
Until recently, such payments were made to the Brotherhood. Note 49
supra. Although the majority assumes this practice does not exist in the plan
under its consideration, note 5 supra, the dissent insinuates its existence in the
indirect form of the lawyers' paying for investigative services of the union's
staff at the time of injury. 377 U.S. at 11; see note I supra.
53. The dissent stresses this allegiance by pointing out that the Brother-
hood's regional lawyers are, in effect, controlled by the union's president who
appoints and can fire them. Ibid. Since a significant part of the livelihood of
the approved lawyers undoubtedly comes through the Brotherhood, allegiance
to the group is very likely.
54. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
55. The dissent in the instant case emphasizes that not only is the injured
worker given the name of the approved lawyer and urged by the local union
official to employ him but the injured member's name and address is also
given to the approved counsel. 377 U.S. at 11. Contact of the member by
union and lawyer makes coercion probable. In addition, considering that union
literature and meetings frequently endorse and mention that this lawyer is
the only one approved, it is unrealistic to assume that the individual member
has much freedom of choice.
56. See note 18 supra. But see note 47 supra.
The Brotherhood's activities in the instant situation undoubtedly encour-
aged litigation to some extent by discouraging settlements which otherwise
would have occurred. However, unless the resultant litigation was unfounded,
the additional burden placed on the courts seems justified in view of the
statutory policy favoring the worker.
57. DREiKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 167 (1953); Note, 25 U. CHi. L. REV. 674, 681
(1958). On the other hand, reliable surveys indicate the existence of much
untapped legal business, especially among people of moderate means. HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AmERICAN LAW 325 (1950). To the extent that the activi-
ties of lay intermediaries, often directed at this class of people, draw out this
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mizes these potential abuses. The objectives of the Brotherhood
and its members very likely coincide. Because both desire adequate
legal representation, the danger of conflicting interests from the
lawyer's divided allegiance to the individual and the group is
remote." Furthermore, the absence of any financial ties between
union and lawyer" ensures the lawyer's independence and pre-
serves his primary allegiance to his client. The Brotherhood's
plan, as construed by the majority, not only minimizes potential
dangers,oo but also furthers a strong federal policy.e1 Therefore,
the conclusion that the State "has failed to show any appreciable
public interest"62 to justify restriction of constitutionality pro-
tected activity is reasonable.
Yet the possible suggestion that no state regulation will be
permitted in the area must be rejected." Great potential dangers
exist which the states traditionally have regulated. Absent over-
riding need for group legal activities, such as the furtherance of an
otherwise frustrated federal policy as found by the instant
majority, the states must be left to determine for themselves
their regulatory interest. Even when such need exists, the states
must be allowed to regulate abuses if regulation does not interfere
with pursuit of the frustrated federal policy. In the present
situation, the State ought to be able to preclude all fee splitting
and to limit coercion by requiring submission of a list of several
qualified attorneys to the member." On the other hand, Button
untapped business, they would increase gross legal revenue to the benefit of
the entire profession. But see note 56 supra and text accompanying.
58. See Note, 72 HAnv. L. REv. 1334, 1344 (1959). However, even in a
membership organization the interests of the group and the individual mem-
ber need not coincide. For instance, prosecution of a given claim may benefit
the individual although the resultant legal precedent would be detrimental to
the group. See generally Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Hanv. L.
REv. 601, 605-16 (1956).
59. But see note 52 supra.
60. As mentioned previously, the dissent is skeptical of the existence of
the facts assumed by the majority. See notes 49 & 59. supra.
61. See notes 46 & 47 supra and accompanying text. Because Button and
the instant case protect lay intermediaries engaged in furthering federal rights,
it is possible that this will be a limit to application of the cases. However, the
constitutional right to associate to achieve the group's goals seems equally
applicable to all kinds of legal and social ends. On the other hand, opposing
state regulatory interest would appear stronger when the state had determined
that rights it created cannot be furthered at the expense of interference with
the practice of law within its borders.
62. 377 U.S. at 8.
63. See note 41 supra.
64. See NAACP v. Button, 871 U.S. 415, 447-48 (1963) (White, J., dissent-
ing); In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. App. 2d 381, 150 N.E.2d
163 (1958).
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and the R. R. Trainmen decision should cause recognition of the
benefits available through lay intermediaries and encourage
modification of traditional blanket opposition to their activities
to the extent consistent with effective avoidance of abuse.
Courts: State Courts Cannot Restrain
Federal Court In Personam Relitigation
Petitioners,' a group of Dallas citizens, brought suit in a
Texas court to restrain the City of Dallas from building an ad-
ditional runway for its municipal airport and from selling bonds
to finance the construction. Under Texas law, the issuance of
municipal bonds is automatically stopped when a suit challeng-
ing their validity is filed? Summary judgment was given for the
city; the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed;' the Supreme
Court of Texas denied review;4 and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.' Petitioners filed another action in fed-
eral district court seeking similar relief and again stopped the
issuance of the bonds. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals then
enjoined petitioners from prosecuting their federal suit. Peti-
1. Plaintiffs originally included 46 Dallas citizens, including their counsel,
Donovan. Later, at the time of filing the action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, plaintiffs were 120 Dallas citizens,
including 27 of the original claimants. Petitioners were the 87 of the 120
plaintiffs who were convicted of contempt. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377
U.S. 408-10 (1964).
2. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1269j-5, § 3 (Supp. 1956) authorizes muni-
cipal airport revenue bonds and provides in part as follows: "The Revenue
Bonds . . . shall not be finally issued until approved by the Attorney General
of Texas and registered by the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State
of Texas, and after such approval shall be incontestable." As explained by
the Texas Supreme Court in its opinion in the instant case, the Attorney
General does not approve issuance as long as the bond validity is under
attack in pending litigation. City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919, 925
(Tex. 1963).
S. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
4. TExAs WmREs OF ERRoR TABsm at 105.
5. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
6. After petitioners filed the second suit in the federal district court, the
city applied to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of prohibition to
bar petitioners from prosecuting their case in the federal court. The Texas
court denied relief holding that it was without power to enjoin petitioners
and that the defense of res judicata on which the city relied could be raised
and adjudicated in the federal court. City of Dallas v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d
372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). The Texas Supreme Court reversed. City of
Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1963). The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals subsequently enjoined petitioners from further prosecution in the
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